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1. Introduction
With the quick development of Internet, it becomes easier to communicate and share resource among different 
terminal devices. According to a recent report casted by Internet Systems Consortium in 2009, there were about 
570,937,778 computers connected to the internet [1]. Another report conducted by Internet World Stats said that
there were more than 2,405,518,376 users surfing Internet in 2012 which is 5.6 times of 2010 [2]. There is no doubt 
that Internet has become an essential tool for pushing the development of the society. However, most of the internet
users and companies are suffering from the risk of data leakage. According to the nonprofit consumer organization 
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, a total of 227,052,199 individual records containing sensitive personal information 
were involved in security breaches in the United States between January 2005 and May 2008 [3]. Data leakage leads
not only to direct loss such as finance compensation and intellectual property loss, but also to indirect loss such as
reputation corruption and customer loss. 2012 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT which was mainly
conducted by the Verizon RISK Team found that 69% of the breaches were caused by malwares including Trojan,
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Abstract
It is well known that data loss caused by data stolen Trojans is huge as it could upload privacy or secret data to hackers who
controls it remotely. Most of current security tools monitor Trojans by scanning the signature code that is distinguished from 
normal software. However, this method can only recognize known Trojan except up-to-date malicious software that has unknown
signature code. Some other security tools requiring preinstalled on hosts detects Trojans by program behaviors. This paper 
proposes a novel medel to detect data stolen Trojans based on their network behaviors. It consists of three detectors: 1) keep-alive
detector detects keep-alive packets or connections; 2) master-slave-connection detector tries to find master and slave connections
and 3) mistake detector analyses the rate of download vs. upload and connection time for different protocol. The experiments
show that this method is efficient in recognizing data stolenTrojans. This protyped system proves the possibility of detection 
Trojans from network.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
829 Yiguo Pu et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  17 ( 2013 )  828 – 835 
virus, and spyware that increased 20% than last year [4]. For example, Flame virus [5] which is found in Iran 2012 
and regarded as most complicated malware can steal any data no matter in disk or RAM if the controllers interest.  
Internet will be in deep disorder if these kinds of malwares spread around the world.  In fact, many researchers have 
contributed great efforts to eliminating this problem by detecting malwares or Trojans. Most these work focuses on 
detecting Trojans on the hosts instead of the network for two reasons: 1) It is convenient to collect detailed data of 
the computers and 2) It is easy to analyze the data and construct a model to detect Trojans. However, this method 
has fatal defects. Firstly, it can t satisfy the need of a network where new devices are deployed no security software 
join the network randomly, and secondly, users may uninstall the security software for some reasons such as 
performance. Under these two circumstances aforementioned, the system can t monitor the computers which are 
more likely steal sensitive data. However, the malicious network flows can be completely monitored and recorded 
from the network. If the difference between benign flows and malicious flows is modeled, it will be more adaptive 
for mutable network. And that is the idea of this paper. 
In this paper, we propose a method to detect data stolen Trojans from the network. It is mainly made up with 
three components. Firstly, we summarize three kinds of network behaviors of data-stolen Trojans. Then we propose 
a model to combine the results made by three sensors based on the network behaviros. At last, experiments show 
that this method is efficient and good-performance in detecting unrecoginsed Trojans. This method is blessed with 3 
advantages than traditional ways: 1) it is easy to deploy; 2) it can detect new Trojans that communicate with the 
same features and 3) it can detect Trojans that are in the host without using security software. 
2. Related work 
Trojans can lead to great loss of intellectual property and finance, so much attention has been draw to how to 
detect Trojans. All these methods can be divided into two categories according where the detector is installed: 
installed on host or installed on network.  According to the technique the detector uses, these methods can also be 
divided into another two catogories: based on signature code or based on behaviors. So we get four groups of 
methods listed as following: 
 
 
 Detector based on signature code installed in host. Traditional signature code based detection method can t find 
up-to-date malicious software as new or transformed signature code can t be known ealier than the software 
appears. To overcome this shortage, some methods have been proposed to generate new signature codes based on 
old ones automaticly. [6] proposed a method to detect new malicious code. [7] also proposed a framework to 
generate signature based on genetic technology. Both of the two methods need get the malicious software before 
it can be detected.  In addtion, [7] suffered from missing detection brand-new malicious software. 
 Detector based on signature code installed in network. This kind of detector use fast match technique to scan all 
packets transmitted in network. Many methods have been proposed, such as Aho-Corasick, and non-Finite 
Automata Machine [8] etc. However, all methods suffer from slow speed or costing too much memory. [9] 
introduced a method about how to get Trojan communication signature code from network. 
 Detector based on behavior installed in host. This method collects some features such as API call sequence and 
generates feature vetors, using attack-tree [10] or other machine learning technology to judge whether the 
program is benign or malicious. This method is good at detecting new malicious software except that it needs be 
installed in host. 
 Detector based on behavior installed in network. This method use statistics or machine learning method to judge 
whether flows are from Trojan or benign programs. [11] focused on how detect keep-alive behavior to find 
Trojans. It sampled the packet sequences and then calculated the Discrete Fourier coefficients of time when 
packets arrived.  They found that the high frequency coefficients of Trojans with keep-alive behavior are smaller 
than benign softwore. Experiments with 107 trojans proved 94.4% Trojans could be detected with this method. 
Zhao tianfu et al. used hackers  operation behavior besides keep-alive behavior in [12]. They found that some 
benign software may disturb the detection procession and came up with some measures to decrease the rate false 
alarm. Our work is different from these works from two aspects. Firstly, we use master slave connection behavior 
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to detect some Trojans, and secondly, we propose download-upload rate and connection time etc. to remove false 
detection which is more efficient than [12]. 
3. Network behaviors of data stolen Trojans 
Data stolen Trojan is a kind of malicious software that aims at stealing sensitive data from vicitm hosts, and most 
of which are made up with a client, always a controller and a server, always as a controlee. To penetrate firewall or 
intranet, some data stolen Trojan variants swap the roles of its two parts, i.e., server is controller, while client is 
controlee. No matter how the data stolen Trojan changes itself, its target for sensitive data never alters. As there is 
few Trojans for other targets instead of stealing data, to make things simple, we just let Trojan be data stolen Trojans, 
data stolen Trojan part in victim s machine as controlee and data stolen Trojan part in hacker s machine as controller 
in this paper. When the controlee runs in the victim s computer, it secretly searches sensitive data and tries to upload 
these data to the controller via the network. During the controller finding a controlee and setting up a connection, 
some special connection will be set up and some packets will be transmitted. We summarize these special behaviors 
as following. 
3.1.  download vs. upload and communication time 
Most Trojan controlees receive commands in short packets and send sensitive data in big packets, so the amount 
of bytes uploaded by the controlee is more than downloaded. Fig.1 (a) shows the rate of download-amount vs. 
upload-amount of normal flows and Trojan flows, from which we can find that POP3 downloads most and SMTP 
almost downloads the same as uploads. Although Trojan always simulates a normal flow, it uploads more than the 
normal Flow. For example, netman, a kind of remote control software, downloads data just one tenth of uploading 
data when transmitting files. The rate for most trojans is less than 1.0 while the rate for benign software is more than 
1.0.  From Fig. 1(b), we find that Trojans always keep their connection for a long time, that s, lasting a few seconds, 
in order to search, query and download data etc, while the connection time of benign flows is short as the softwares 
behind these flows tend to use less resource to serve more clients. 
 
Fig. 1 (a) the rate of download vs. upload of different applications. (b) the connection time in second of different applications 
3.2.  keep-alive 
After the connection between controlee and the controller is set up, one of the two parts would send pulse packets 
or connects to the other part to make sure the other part is online. In fact, there always are three kinds of keep-alive 
behaviors listed in Table 1. In TCP protocol, program can call function setsockopt(socket, SOL_SOCKET, 
SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&keepAlive, sizeof(keepAlive)) to make the socket send keep-alive packets to the other 
part when it is idle.  Both benign programs and malicious programs can send TCP Keep-alive packets. The second 
type of keep-alive behaviors is based on short TCP connections, most of which last for less than 5 seconds. For 
example, PCShare will establish a short connection from controlee every 30 seconds to tell controller that it is online. 
Some Trojans use long TCP connection to transmit small packets as described in the third type keep-alive. Except 
the first type of keep-alive, the other types exert periodical behavior which can be detected. 
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Table 1. Three types of Trojan keep-alive 
Keep-alive type Description Example 
TCP keep alive One part send a packet with 1 byte to the 
other part 
GrayPigeon 
Short connection One part set up period connects to the 
other part 
PCShare 
Long connection One part send periodic packets to the 
other part 
Shangxing remote 
control software 
 
3.3. master connection vs. slave connection 
Some Trojans use more than one connection to transmit data as more connections may speed up the stealing data 
and ease control logic. When the controller wants to get sensitive data from the controlee, it will firstly send a 
command and some parameters to the controlee in the original connection.  Then the controlee will execute the 
command by setting up a new connection to the controller and sending the data in the new connection. The original 
connection can be called master connection and the new connection can be called slave connection.  The direction of 
packet containing commands and parameters is opposite to the slave connection. This kind of behavior can be found 
in Trojan gh0st etc. 
4. Trojan detect model 
The method we propose in this paper is made up three steps as Fig. 2. Network packets are restored to TCP flows, 
which are feed to keep-alive detector (KAD) and master-slave-connection detector (MSCD) respectly. Both results 
of the two detectors are input to mistake detector (MD). After assured by MD, Trojan information will be submitted 
in accidents database. 
.HHSDOLYHGHWHFWRU
0DVWHUVODYH
FRQQHFWLRQGHWHFWRU
0LVWDNHGHWHFWRU $FFLGHQWVGDWDEDVH
1HWZRUN
IORZV
 
Fig. 2 The data flow of the detection model 
4.1.  Keep-alive detector (KAD) 
As summarized in Table 1, data stolen Trojans may use one or more types of keep-alive to keep in touch with 
each other. Fig. 3 illustrates how the keep-alive works. That s, during the connection, one part communicates with 
the other part every a few seconds. [11] proposed a method to checking whether a series of packets are keep-alive 
packets to detect the keep-alive behaviors. This method can be easy to be bypassed as it just considered simple 
circumstance. MENG Lei et al. proposed more complicated system (Trojan Rapid Detection System) based on 
Discrete Fourier transform in [12]. However, this method just considered the time of packets and ignored the size of 
the packets, besides it is hard to compute factors. We propose a method that can find all three types of keep-alive.  
This method is divided into three steps. Firstly, we check whether the connection has first type of keep-alive 
behavior.  Let Nkeep-alive be the number of the keep-alive packets in a connection S. If 
, 
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then S most likely sends keepalive packets. A keep-alive packet satisfies  
, 
where Ack and Seq is the packet s ack number and seq number in TCP header; subscript s and c indicates whether 
this packet is sent by server or client; and PacketSize is the number of bytes in the packet. If the connection does not 
have TCP keep-alive behavior, then we check for the second type keep-alive behavior in long connection. As keep-
alive packets have similar size, we can cluster all packets by packet size and check whether packets in same cluster 
are sent periodically. If (3) satisfied, this connection may have keep-alive behavior. 
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                                                                                  (3). 
Tk,i indicates the i th packet in cluster k. nk is the number of packets in cluster k. is deviation threshold and N is 
threshold of the number of packets. Thirdly, for short connection keep-alive, we cluster all connections of two hosts 
by the number of bytes sent and check whether connections in the same cluster are periodic. The procedure of 
cluster is based on a recursive method, as Fig. 4.  The inverse of similarity between two packets or connections is 
defined as (4), where PacketSize and PacketSize  are number of bytes transmitted in two different packets or 
connections and  is the average number of bytes. 
3DFNHW6L]H
3DFNHW6L]H3DFNHW6L]H 
                                                                                                                   (4). 
4.2. Master slave connection detector(MSCD) 
Some key features of this behavior are summarized as following: 
 controlee always sets up a slave connection to penetrate the intranet;  
 the slave connection is set up after a command packet sent in opposite direction; 
 slave connection uploads more data than downloads; 
 slave connection time is shorter than master connection. 
Some other benign software such as FTP behaves as master-slave-connection too, but its client mostly downloads 
data in the slave connection. So we can record all connection between two hosts and try to find master-slave-
connection by these features. The procedure of MSCD is showed in Fig. 5. 
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FRQWUROOHU
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Fig. 3 how the keep-alive works 
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,QLWLDOL]H LQSXW 6
DQ DUUD\ RI QXPEHUV
HDFK RI ZKLFK LV WKH
QXPEHU RI E\WHV LQ D
SDFNHW RU FRQQHFWLRQ
RI D VHULHV
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DOORFDWH D FRXQW DUUD\ DQG
FOHDU WKH DUUD\
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6RUW WKH FRXQW DUUD\ LQ
GHVFHQG RUGHU
,V WKHUH DQ HOHPHQW
OHIW LQ FRXQW DUUD\"
3HHN WKH PD[LPXP HOHPHQW LQ WKH
FRXQW DUUD\ DQG ILQG DOO RI LWV
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VWRUHG LQ D QHZ DUUD\ 'HOHWH DOO
HOHPHQWV RI WKH QHZ DUUD\ IURP 6
5HWXUQ DOO
QHZ DUUD\V
QR
\HV
Fig. 4 the procedure of clustering
Fig. 5 master-slave-connection behavior detector
4.3. Mistake detector (MD)
In Fig. 1, we make a statistics about download vs. upload and time of some applications, so we get the rate range
of all protocols. If the rate of upload vs. download excesses the range, the flow may be suspicious.  Since some 
applications may send less than that value, we make a range for all applications. If the download vs. upload rate less
than the lower bound standard: , where is a parameter and Deviationrate is the
standard deviation of Ratestandard, then the connection may be suspicious. Trojan s connection always lasts for a long
time. If the connection keeps for a short time, it may not be Trojan connection. In mistake detector, we judge a
MSCD procedure
Input: TCP connection or packet sequence
Output: connection that have master-slave-connection behaviour
Initialize:
Set up a hash table to record all TCP connection, the key is source IP address and
destination IP address, the value is a record structure containing connection information.
Detect:
If input is a new TCP connection:
Get all connections sharing same source IP address and destination IP address;
For each connection:
If the size of last packet it received is smaller than size_threshold and the 
time when it received the last packet < now-time_threshold
        Record this connection is a suspicious master-slave connection and 
its suspicious master connection;
End if
End for
Else if input is a new packet:
Update the last time sending packet or receiving packet and packet size of the flow 
that carries the packet.
Else if input is a closed TCP connection:
If the connection is a suspicious master-slave connection:
If there is one of its suspicious master connections living:
If the master connection s upload vs. download rate is bigger than
that of slave connection:
Find master-slave-connection behaviour and record the
slave connection and its master connection.
End if
End if
End if
End if
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connetion is a data leakage Trojan flow if it satisfies (5), where ConnectionTimestandard is the average connection 
time of data stolen Trojans.
5. Experiments
In order not to disturb the normal network stream, we copy the network flows to detect server as Fig. 6. We use
about 11 prevalent Trojans and 8 innocent softwares listed as Table 2. These benign softwares are easy found in
some PCs, most of which keep in touch with its server remotely. Just a small part of softwares are included in the
experiment, as we just want to verify the validity of our method. The experiment result shows that this method can 
find trojans efficiently. We also find some benign software shows some behaviors similar with data leakage trojans,
but this method can efficiently filter out these programs as they download more than upload.
,QWHUQHW
3&
3& 3&
URXWHU
'HWHFW VHUYHU 'DWDEDVH VHUYHU
Fig. 6 the top of the experiment network
Table 2. Detect result of the model
Trojan
Name
Keep-alive Master-
slave-
connection
Software 
Name
Keep-alive Master-
slave-
connection
Keep alive type period Keep alive type period
huigezi Tcp keep-alive - no secureCRT no - no
Gh0st Tcp keep-alive - yes SGWallPap
er
No - no
netsys Long connection 30s yes Foxmail Long
connection
300s no
Pcshare Short connection 13s yes VNCclient No <1s no
shangxingy
uankong
Long connection 30s yes Winscp no - no
blackhole Long connection 60s yes Fetion No - no
Drat2011 Short connection 50s yes Mysql
client
No - no
srat Short connection 10s no youdaoDict No - no
Shouwangz
he(fly)
Short connection 30s no
zxshell Long connection <1s no
Liuying
V2.5
long connection 30s yes
6. Conclusion
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This paper summarizes four network behaviors of data leakage Trojan: download vs. upload, connection time, 
keep-alive and master-slave connection, and proposes an efficient model to detect them from network. Experiments 
show this method is efficient and good-performance. Howerver, as some benign software may shows same 
behaviors as Trojans and Trojans also may disguise themselves to bypass the detect system, it is possible to make 
false positive judges and false negative judges. To overcome this defect, we can supplement the detect system in 
following aspects in the future: 
 Combine the detect results from the hosts to make a integrate judge. For example, if we detect keep-alive 
behavior in a flow, and a suspicious API call sequence in a process is found on the host that participates in the 
flow, we can make a more correct judgement than that is made just according network behaviors. 
 Construct user models to assist to make judgement. Ma Li et al. found that internet user models can be modeled 
by IP address and services in [13]. If a network flow violating the user s normal model is recorded, we can use 
the result of the system proposed in this paper to decrease the false positives. 
 Use more network features such the random degree of the data carried by the flow, black list and white list etc. to 
enhance the detect result of the system. 
Data leakage is a great problem for many companies and goverments and actracts more and more attention. We 
need specilized system for different threat of data leakage. This paper gives an example of detection data leakage 
Trojans in network and may lay a foundation for further research in this field. 
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